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LEGISLATION
Federal Diversity Jurisdiction-
Citizenship for Unincorporated Associations
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1889 the United States Supreme Court ruled in Chapman v.
Barney' that a New York joint stock company was not to be con-
sidered a "citizen" for purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction. This
decision provided the basis for the rule that unincorporated associa-
tions are not considered juridical persons, and that the citizenship
of their individual members is determinative of federal diversity.2
Corporations have been recognized as "citizens" for diversity pur-
poses since 1844,3 while unincorporated associations, such as partner-
ships, joint stock companies, and labor unions, have yet to be so
recognized. They have been subject to the doctrine of Chapman v.
Barney, which virtually denies them entrance to the federal courts.
Since lack of diversity (i.e., opposing litigants residing in the same
state) between plaintiff and defendant prevents federal jurisdiction,4
unincorporated associations with members from several states can
rarely obtain the necessary complete diversity.
Criticism of the distinction has been abundant, both among the legal
commentators5 and in the lower federal courts.6 Many unincorporated
1. 129 U.S. 677 (1889).
2. Although Chapman v. Barney is most often cited for the general rule, its holding
was initially ignored by the lower federal courts as resting on bad pleading. See
Andrew Bros. Co. v. Youngstown Coke Co., 86 Fed. 585 (6th Cir. 1898). The
"true" leading case is Great So. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449 (1900).
See Note, 66 YALE L.J. 712, 742-44 & n.185 (1957).
3. Louisville, C. & C.R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844). This case
recognized corporations as separate entities and deemed them citizens of the state of
incorporation. This rule was interpreted as being based upon a "conclusive presump-
tion" that the citizenship of a corporation is that of its members in Marshall v.
Baltimore & O.R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314 (1853), which remained the law
until 1958. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964). Prior to Letson, corporate citizenship was
dependent upon the citizenship of the stockholders. See Bank of United States v.
Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809).
4. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). See Rosendale v. Phillips,
87 F.2d 454 (2d Cir. 1937); Moore & Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction: Past, Present,
and Future, 43 TEXAs L. REV. 1, 32 (1961). The validity of the complete diversity
rule has recently been questioned in ALI, STUDY OF D vISION OF JURsnICTION BETWEEN
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS, OFFICIAL DRAFT, Supporting Memorandum A, at 180
(1965) [hereinafter cited as ALI STUDy].
5. See, e.g., 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE ff 17.25, at 1413 (2d ed. 1963); IIAnT
& WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND TnE FEDERAL SYSTEM 917 (1953).
6. See, e.g., Mason v. American Express Co., 334 F.2d 392, 393 (2d Cir. 1964);
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associations today do not differ functionally from corporations, and
the structural characteristics of each are becoming increasingly
parallel.7 Furthermore, unincorporated associations seem no less dis-
tinct from their members than corporations are from their share-
holders.8 Indeed, "there seems to be no good reason for treating the
two differently for purposes of diversity jurisdiction." 9
Until 1958, corporate citizenship was derived solely from the act
of incorporating,10 so that no legislative guide existed for finding
analogous citizenship in organizations having no state of incorpora-
tion." The 1958 Congress, however, provided the basis for such an
analogy by amending the diversity statute to make corporations
citizens of the state of principal place of business as well as of the
state of incorporation.' 2
While the legislative history of the 1958 amendment reveals no
consideration of a similar extension of diversity jurisdiction to unin-
corporated associations,'13 the lower federal courts took renewed
interest in revision of the 1889 rule. Most were content to recognize
its injustice, yet continue to follow the established rule in the absence
of any Supreme Court decision to the contrary.' 4 Some courts, 5
however, examined a particular 1933 Supreme Court decision 6 as
potential justification for a rule change. In that decision, an unin-
corporated association was recognized as a juridical person for di-
Van Sant v. American Express Co., 169 F.2d 355, 372 (3d Cir. 1948); Busby v.
Electric Util. Employees Union, 147 F.2d 865, 868 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
7. United Steelworkers v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1965).
8. Ex parte Edelstein, 30 F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 1929) (dissenting opinion).
9. Moore & Weekstein, supra note 4, at 33.
10. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1964) and cases cited in note 3 supra.
11. Although not a diversity case, Sperry Prods., Inc. v. Association of Am. R.Rs.,
132 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 744 (1943), held that an unin-
corporated association was located "wherever any substantial part of its activities were
continuously carried on." Id. at 411. Apparently the Second Circuit felt no need for
legislative guidance in formulating such a test. While ."substantial business" has
some support today, see 6 UTAH. L. lEv. 231, 242-43 (1958), the "principal place of
business" test of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1964) has general approval for determining
citizenship of unincorporated associations. See ALI STruY, supra note 4, at §
1301(b) (2).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1964).
13. See 78 HARv. L. REv. 1661, 1663 (1965). Cf. H.R. REP. No. 1706, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess. 4 (1958); S. REP. No. 1930, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); 104 CoNG. REc.
1283-90 (1958).
14. See, e.g., Calagaz v. Calhoon, 309 F.2d 248, 251 (5th Cir. 1962); Mason v.
American Express Co., 224 F. Supp. 288, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), rev'd, 334 F.2d 392
(2d Cir. 1964) ("with great reluctance and equal regret"). But see Stein v. American
Fed'n of Musicians, 183 F. Supp. 99, 101 (M.D. Tenn. 1960) ("persuasive reasons
suggest themselves why the present rule should not be disturbed").
15. Mason v. American Express Co., supra note 6; American Fed'n of Musicians v.
Stein, 213 F.2d 679, 686 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 873 (1954) (rule 'losing
its vitality").
16. Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476 (1933).
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versity purposes, based on the civil law recognition in Puerto Rico
of that type of organization as a legal entity.17 In a 1964 decision,
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, convinced that the break
with the past was a "clear one," treated a New York joint stock
company as a citizen of New York in finding diversity jurisdiction. 8
The Supreme Court, however, resolved all doubts about the validity
of the established rule in a 1965 decision, United Steelworkers v.
R.H. Bouligny, Inc.19 Mr. Justice Fortas, speaking for the Court,
reaffirmed the validity of Chapman v. Barney, distinguishing both
the 1933 Puerto Rico case20 and the 1964 Second Circuit decision. 21
The Court was apparently sympathetic with those who would revise
the rule, but felt itself incapable of enunciating an alternative. 2
Whether unincorporated labor unions ought to be assimilated to the
status of corporations for diversity purposes, how such citizenship is to be
determined, and what if any related rules ought to apply, are decisions
which we believe suited to the legislative and not the judicial branch,
regardless of our views as to the intrinsic merits of petitioner's argument-
merits stoutly attested by widespread support for the recognition of labor
unions as juridical personalities 23
The questions left for the legislature, then, are two-fold-should
the existing rule be changed, and, if so, what should be the substance
of the change? That is, by what test should the state citizenship of
unincorporated associations be determined?
II. NEcEssrry FOR CHANGE,
The case for recognition of unincorporated associations as separate
legal entities has been thoroughly and convincingly stated by several
authorities. 24 Our concern is but a single aspect of this problem-
that is, the recognition of unincorporated associations as legal entities
17. Id. at 480-81.
18. Mason v. American Express Co., supra note 6, at 397. Describing the general
rule as "beginning to show signs of being outmoded," the Third Circuit had reached
a similar result for a New York joint stock association in Van Sant v. American
Express Co., supra note 6, at 372.
19. United Steelworkers v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., supra note 7.
20. Id. at 151-52. For a criticism of the distinction see 78 HvAuv. L. REv. 1661,
1662 (1965).
21. United Steelworkers v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., supra note 7, at 152 n.10 (noting
disagreement, but not disapproval).
22. Id. at 152.
23. Id. at 153.
24. UMW v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 385-86 (1922); Forkosch, The
Legal Status and Suability of Labor Organizations, 28 TEMP. L.Q. 1,2-5 (1954);
Sturges, Unincorporated Associations as Parties to Actions, 33 YALE L.J. 383 (1924);
Note, Unions As juridical Persons, 66 YALE L.J. 712 (1957).
[ VOL.. 19
1966 1 LEGISLATION
for federal diversity jurisdiction. Such recognition unfortunately has
not been a concomitant of recognition as a juridical person for other
purposes, such as the ability to sue or be sued.
The need to change the rule of Chapman v. Barney is apparent
when the reasons behind the adoption and extension of federal
diversity jurisdiction are related to the situation of the unincorporated
association. Under the Constitution, "The judicial Power shall extend
... to controversies .. .between citizens of different states. ... 26
Such controveries originally prompted federal jurisdiction for a num-
ber of reasons, all of which apply to the unincorporated association.
[I]n order to the inviolable maintenance of that equality of privileges and
immunities to which citizens of the Union will be entitled, the national
judiciary ought to preside in all cases in which one State or its citizens are
opposed to another State or its citizens. To secure the full effect of so
fundamental a provision against all evasion and subterfuge, it is necessary
that its construction should be committed to that tribunal which, having no
local attachments, will be likely to be impartial between the different States
and their citizens and which, owing its official existence to the Union, will
never be likely to feel any bias inauspicious to the principles on which it is
founded. 27
The most frequently asserted reason for federal diversity jurisdiction
is the avoidance of local prejudice against out-of-state litigants.
2
A partnership, when involved in foreign litigation, however, would
seem to have the same claim to federal jurisdiction as a corporation.
Each is subject to the same prejudice toward foreigners that prompted
diversity jurisdiction. Nevertheless, for all practical purposes only
the corporation has access to the federal courts, because in the case
of the partnership, one partner's citizenship in the same state as that
of an opposing litigant destroys the required complete diversity of
25. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b) provides for suability of unincorporated associations in
federal courts, although citizenship for diversity purposes is unrecognized.
26. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2.
27. TI FEDERALIST No. 80, at 114 (Dunne ed. 1901) (Hamilton).
28. Moore & Weckstein, Corporations and Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction: A
Supreme Court Fiction Revisited, 77 HAv. L. REv. 1426, 1448 (1964). "[Nlone of
the significant prejudices which beset our society today begins or ends when a state
line is traversed. On the one hand, there are prejudices on racial, religious, economic,
and other grounds which affect the administration of justice between co-citizens as
much as in those involving an out-of-stater. On the other hand, the bias which was
formerly thought to operate against out-of-staters as such still seems to exist to some
degree with respect to persons from a more distant part of the country. . . . It would
be hard to justify the creation of diversity jurisdiction on the ground because the
state-state relationship is not the reason for the prejudice. At the same time, it would
be hard to justify the total abolition of an existing jurisdiction while there remains
risk of the very kind of prejudice against which the federal judicial power was
originally designed to provide protection, even though more than one state line must
be crossed before it is encountered." ALI STtny, supra note 4, commentary at 51-52.
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citizenship. Likewise, national labor unions have a special need for
protection from local prejudice.21 Local juries tend to favor local
interests at the expense of the non-resident labor union, and may be
swayed by a fear of unionization of local industry.30 Evidence has
been introduced to show that the fear of both economic and racial
effects of unionization has affected local justice.
31
A second basis for diversity jurisdiction is the encouragement of
commercial investment.32 By assuring federal justice to out-of-state
businessmen, diversity jurisdiction exercises "a great influence in
fostering interstate commerce and investment, sustaining the public
credit and sanctity of contracts, and welding the states into a single
nation."3 3 Yet these advantages are unavailable to unincorporated
associations, although substantial investment in such associations
might be induced with a diminished threat of local litigation.
The procedural advantages of the federal courts provide a most
important justification for diversity jurisdiction, and a most cogent
argument for its extension to unincorporated associations.m Federal
jurisdiction assures the non-resident litigant the advantages of modern
pleading practice, pretrial and trial procedures.35  Further, federal
judges are less exposed to local pressures than their state counterparts,
federal juries are chosen from broader socio-economic strata, and
appellate review takes place in courts "reflecting a multistate perspec-
tive" 6 Denying unincorporated associations the opportunity to obtain
federal jurisdiction would also remove them from the "mainstream of
general tort and contract litigation."37
A fourth reason for diversity jurisdiction is the desire to achieve
uniformity of decision in commercial law, conflicts of law, and inter-
national law.38 Although the decision in Erie R.R. v. Tompkin 3 9 left
29. See Note, Unions As Juridical Persons, supra note 24, at 745, noting a congres-
sional study showing the biased use of injunctions against labor unions in the Southeast.
30. United Steelworkers v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., supra note 7, at 150.
31. Ibid.
32. Wnxcm-, FEDERAL CouRTs 68-69 (1963); Friendly, The Historic Basis of Di-
versity Jurisdiction, 41 HAnv. L. Rnv. 483, 495-99 (1928).
33. Moore & Weckstein, supra note 28, at 1448-49.
34. The vitality of this justification for diversity jurisdiction has recently been
questioned by one source, which finds social and economic incentives for commercial
expansion today sufficient to override consideration of local litigation. ALI STUDY, supra
note 4, commentary at 50-51.
35. Moore & Weckstein, supra note 28, at 1449. The delay of justice resulting
from congested metropolitan dockets and other state procedural inefficiencies should
not be the political responsibility of the out-of-stater. See ALI STUDY, supra note 4,
commentary at 53. Yet the rule of Chapman v. Barney does attach such responsibility
to unincorporated associations.
36. United Steelworkers v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., supra note 7, at 150.
37. Moore & Weekstein, supra note 28, at 1449.
38. Id. at 1450.
39. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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matters of substantive law to the states, federal courts still sit as
"another court of the state" and can thus contribute to uniformity.40
With diversity jurisdiction available to all unincorporated associations,
federal courts would have a greater opportunity to construe similarly
state statutes concerning such associations.
41
The bases for federal diversity jurisdiction, therefore, appear ap-
plicable to unincorporated associations. The needs that created
diversity jurisdiction are the same ones that require its extension;
yet the courts persist in distinguishing the incorporated from the
unincorporated forms of organization. The primary justification for
different treatment has been that the unincorporated association is
but an association of individuals, the legal personality of which is too
incomplete to merit citizenship for diversity purposes.42 This argu-
ment is maintained despite federal recognition of the unincorporated
association's capacity to sue or be sued,43 and venue provisions recog-
nizing unions as entities under federal labor acts.44 The courts have
bolstered their reasoning by pointing to the administrative difficulty
of determining state citizenship. 45 The primary justification for dif-
ferent treatment, however, lacks sound basis today; and without it,
the secondary justification cannot stand alone. Its difficulties are not
insuperable.
Other than the actual filing of articles of incorporation, the modern
unincorporated association may have all or most of the character-
istics of a corporation. 46 But disregarding functional similarities, dif-
ferent treatment should not turn on factors such as personal liability
of individual members, or transferability of shares. Citizenship for
diversity purposes should depend wholly upon the existence of a
distinct entity, having an identity separate from that of its members.47
40. Moore & Weekstein, supra note 28, at 1450.
41. Problems of pre-emption and state court resolution of federal questions illustrate
the need for uniformity in the labor law field. See Note, Unions As Juridical Persons,
supra note 24, at 745-48.
42. Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., supra note 16, at 480.
43. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b); see note 60 infra.
44. 20 U.S.C. § 185(c) (1964). See also the arguments for treating a partnership
as a legal person in CnaNE&-, P.ARrTNsms § 3, at 9-21 (2d ed. 1952).
45. United Steelworkers v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., supra note 7, at 152 ("difficulties
which we could not adequately resolve"); Stein v. American Fed'n of Musicians, supra
note 14, at 101 ("no satisfactory alternative method of determining the citizenship
of such an association").
46. Unincorporated associations generally include partnerships, limited partnerships,
joint stock companies, joint ventures, Massachusetts or business trusts, and labor
unions. The characteristics said to distinguish the corporate form are creation pur-
suant to filing of articles of incorporation, transferability of shares, continuity of
existence, centralization of management, right to sue or be sued as an entity, and the
absence of personal liability of shareholders for the debts of the corporation. See
LATr N, CoaRoPRrONS 1-72 (1959).
47. See United Steelworkers v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., supra note 7, at 149-50.
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Where the real party in interest is an unincorporated association, and
the opposing litigant is a citizen of a different state, the conflicting
state interests provide the "federal element" basic to diversity juris-
diction. 8
With the nationwide expansion of unincorporated associations,
reasons for treating them as citizens and residents which were non-
existent in 1889 are now apparent.49 Collective bargaining is now
practiced on a national scale,50 executive governing bodies of many
unincorporated associations have the power of corporate boards of
directors,51 and the resulting unity of action of the unincorporated
association has become incompatible with the idea of individual as-
sociation and action. In sustaining diversity treatment for an unin-
corporated Puerto Rican association, the Supreme Court recognized
several corporate-like characteristics as compelling its decision.
52
But the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit termed the attributes
of unincorporated labor unions discussed by Chief Justice Taft in
UMW v. Coronado Coal Co.5 3 as "much more impressive to compel
recognition . . as juridical persons" than those cited in the Puerto
Rico case.54
Thus it appears that not only is the basis for federal diversity
equally applicable to unincorporated associations, but the functional
differences between the incorporated and unincorporated forms of
organization are negligible with regard to diversity jurisdiction.
Further justification for changing the rule of Chapman v. Barney
can be found in the inadequacy of the Court's position in that case.
Not only did the Court raise the jurisdictional point on its own
motion,55 but it made no effort "to determine whether the reasons for
extending citizenship to a corporation might apply with equal force
to a joint stock association." 56 The Court failed to mention a prior
48. Moore & Weckstein, supra note 4, at 27.
49. See UMW v. Coronado Coal Co., supra note 24, at 385-89.
50. Ex parte Edelstein, supra note 8, at 639 (dissenting opinion).
51. See UMW v. Coronado Coal Co., supra note 24, at 383-84, discussed in Ameri-
can Fed'n of Musicians v. Stein, supra note 15, at 688.
52. Some of the attributes of the Puerto Rican association were its right to
"contract, own property and transact business, sue and be sued in its own name and
right," creation by articles of association on public record, endurance beyond the
death of individual members, centralization of management, and absence of personal
liability of members for the association's acts and debts. Puerto Rico v. Russell &
Co., supra note 16, at 481-82.
53. Supra note 24, at 383-89.
54. American Fed'n of Musicians v. Stein, supra note 15, at 687.
55. Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677, 682 (1889); see criticism in Note, Unions
As Juridical Persons, supra note 24, at 744 n.185.
56. Mason v. American Express Co., 334 F.2d 392, 395 (2d Cir. 1964).
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case 7 permitting an unincorporated association to be recognized as
a corporation under the privileges and immunities clause of article IV,
section 2.s Further, Chapman v. Barney was decided in a Congres-
sional climate of jurisdictional limitation, which may have discouraged
a vast extension of diversity jurisdiction to unincorporated associa-
tions.59
One commentator has argued that close reading of Rule 17(b)
60
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure further reveals the need to
change the rule of Chapman v. Barney.61 The "except' clause of
Rule 17(b) gives unincorporated associations the capacity to sue or
be sued in their common names where jurisdiction is based upon a
federal right. In all other situations, state law as to capacity to sue
or be sued is to control. But the courts have held that where juris-
diction is based upon diversity of citizenship, even though capacity
to sue or be sued has been accorded the unincorporated association
under state law, complete diversity must be found in the citizenship
of the individual members of the association.62
In order that the last sentence of Rule 17(b) [the 'except! clause] be
generally effective in cases where jurisdiction is founded upon diversity of
citizenship the present federal rule on jurisdiction must be changed: the
partnership or other unincorporated association which is given capacity to
sue or be sued must be endowed with 'citizenship,' for purposes of federal
jurisdiction. Such treatment might well be accorded them, and could be
worked out along lines developed in the corporate field.6
3
However, Rule 17(b) is generally regarded as having no effect upon
the diversity requirement.
Dissatisfaction with the doctrine of Chapman v. Barney has led
57. Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Mass., 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 566 (1870), discussed in Mason
v. American Express Co., supra note 56, at 396 & n.6.
58. Mason v. American Express Co., supra note 56, at 396.
59. See United Steelworkers v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1965).
60. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b): "(b) CAPACITY TO SUE OR BE SUED. The capacity
of an individual, other than one acting in a representative capacity, to sue or be sued
shall be determined by the law of his domicile. The capacity of a corporation to sue
or be sued shall be determined by the law under which it was organized. In all other
cases capacity to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law of the state in which
the district court is held, except (1) that a partnership or other unincorporated associa-
tion which has no such capacity by the law of such state, may sue or be sued in its
common name for the purpose of enforcing for or against it a substantive right existing
under the Constitution or laws of the United States .... "
61. 3 MooRE, FEDRAL PRAcmTcE § 17.25, at 1412-13 (2d ed. 1963).
62. Id. at 1412. See discussion of the complete diversity requirement in note 4 supra.
63. 3 MoonE, op. cit. supra note 61, at 1413.
64. See Mason v. American Express Co., supra note 56, at 396 n.7; Brocki v. American
Express Co., 279 F.2d 785 (6th Cir. 1960); ALI STUy, commentary at 61. Contra,
Van Sant v. American Express Co., 169 F.2d 355 (3d Cir. 1948).
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to a general recognition of the class action under Rule 23(a)65 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a legitimate means for circum-
venting the doctrine.66 In class actions, diversity need be satisfied
only as to the representative of the class.67 Although some defects
in the use of the class suit have been noted,6 its increasing use has
demonstrated that the present rule of Chapman v. Barney is an un-
satisfactory one. The rule is incompatible with the purposes of di-
versity jurisdiction, it gives credence to an unreasonable jurisdictional
distinction between the incorporated and unincorporated forms of
organization, and it rests on a precedent of questionable validity. The
necessity for change is apparent.
III. SUBSTANCE OF THE CHANGE
Having recognized the injustice of the present rule, it is necessary
to revise it to conform with the purposes of diversity jurisdiction,
yet ensure that it be administratively feasible. There is general agree-
ment that the proper location for citizenship of unincorporated
associations should be the state of "principal place of business."
69
However, little thought seems to have been given to the application
of this standard other than that the interpretations of this rule for
corporate diversity jurisdiction should be helpful.70 "Principal place
of business," unfortunately, is an unrefined term of art. It has
received two widely divergent, but well-organized interpretations,71
and at least five lesser meanings have found support from either courts
65. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a): "(a) REPRESENTATION. If persons constituting a
class are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court,
such of them, one or more, as will fairly insure the adequate representation of all may,
on behalf of all, sue or be sued .... "
66. See Mason v. American Express Co., supra note 56, at 402; Marydale Prods.
Co. v. United Packinghouse Workers, 322 F.2d 224, 227 (5th Cir. 1963); Wright, op.
cit. supra note 32, at 78-79.
67. Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
68. See Note, The Problem of Capacity in Union Suits: A Potpouri of Eric, Diversity
and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 68 YALE L.J. 1182, 1185 (1959); 78 HMunv.
L. REv. 1661, 1664 n.19 (1965).
69. In controversies concerning unincorporated associations, "the individual members
are only indirectly affected and it is the organization itself, the aggregate of all the
members bound together by their economic investment, that is the true party in
interest. Thus the principal place of business is an appropriate criterion by which to
govern an incorporated or unincorporated association's access to the federal courts .... "
Moore & Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction: Past, Present, and Future, 43 TEXAs L.
REv. 1, 34 (1964). Contra, Stein v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 183 F. Supp. 99,
101 (M.D. Tenn. 1960).
70. 3 MooRE, op. cit. supra note 61, at 1413; see 78 HARv. L. REv. 1661, 1664
(1965).
71. These are the so-called "nerve-center" and "place of operations" tests, which are
discussed in the text following note 74 infra.
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or commentators.72 Rather than select from among these alternative
definitions, or extend the vague general corporate standard, the
Supreme Court has appealed for legislative assistance. 3 The mandate
is for something more than the skeleton formula of "principal place
of business."
The two major tests of principal place of business are the "nerve-
center" and "place-of-operations" tests.74 The former finds citizen-
ship in the state where major policy decisions are made and ultimate
control is exercised. Normally it is there that administrative and
financial offices are located, executive meetings are held, and tax
returns are filed.75 The "nerve-center" test has been held most ap-
propriate for corporations "which are both diversified and decentral-
ized or have subsidiaries in several states." 76 The rule becomes one
of convenience, permitting ease of identification of citizenship for
widespread corporations.7 7 It would be ideal for some national labor
unions, whose central decision-making location would be easily identi-
fiable, but whose numerous locals would prohibit determination of a
principal place of operations.7 8
The "place-of-operations" test looks to the state of central industrial
activity, which is ordinarily the location of most of the organization's
tangible assets and employees.7 9 It was applied in Inland Rubber
72. These are the Kelly, "localized business," "substantial business," "gross income,"
and "state-of-impingement" tests, which are mentioned in the text and footnotes fol-
lowing note 84 infra. "Principal place of business" has also been defined by decisions
interpreting the Bankruptcy Act, 76 Stat. 570 (1962), 11 U.S.C. § 11(a) (1) (1964),
which contains the same language. See cases listed in 11 U.S.C.A. § 11, nn.197-202.
73. United Steelworkers v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., supra note 59, at 147, 153; see also
text at note 23 supra.
74. See Moore & Weckstein, supra note 28, at 1439-40.
75. See Scot Typewriter Co. v. Underwood Corp., 170 F. Supp. 862, 865 (S.D.N.Y.
1959); Moore & Weckstein, supra note 28, at 1440.
76. Moore & Weckstein, supra note 28, at 1444. See Sabo v. Standard Oil Co., 295
F.2d 893, 894-95 (7th Cir. 1961); Lancer Indus., Inc. v. American Ins. Co., 197 F.
Supp. 894, 898-99 (W.D. La. 1961).
The "nerve-center" test is analogous to the test used in state and local taxation in
determining "commercial domicile" for allocation of income. See Chicago, Duluth &
Georgian Bay Transit Co. v. Michigan Corp. & See. Comm'n, 31 Mich. 14, 22, 29
N.W.2d 303, 306 (1947).
77. Even where the "place-of-operations" test has been adopted, it has been
acknowledged that the "nerve-center" test would be more convenient if there were no
state in which operations predominated. Inland Rubber Corp. v. Triple A Tire Serv.
Inc., 220 F. Supp. 490, 496 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); see Moore & Weckstein, supra note
28, at 1442.
78. Local labor organizations would -not be recognized as citizens for diversity
purposes under such a test. This might be unrealistic, however, because locals are
sometimes independent bodies, capable of determining their own policies. The "local
establishment" qualification of the American Law Institute proposal (see text accom-
panying note 108 infra) is a possible compromise. See comment by Mr. Justice Fortas
in United Steelworkers v. R. H. Bouligny, Inc., supra note 58, at 152-53 & n.12.
79. Moore & Weckstein, Corporations and Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdicton: A
Supreme Court Fiction Revisited, 77 HAnv. L. 1Ev. 1426, 1439-40 (1964).
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Corp. v. Triple A Tire Service, Inc.,80 in which an Ohio-controlled
corporation was deemed a citizen of New York, where most of its
employees were located, its sales solicited, and its credit and adver-
tising decisions made. The courts have generally employed this test
where control is in one state and physical operations are "wholly or
predominantly in another state."81 This test would appear better
suited to partnerships and joint stock companies than to labor unions.
No more administrative difficulty would seem apparent for the unin-
corporated than for the incorporated organization in determining
the principal place of operations. Corporate precedents could be ac-
curately applied to the larger unincorporated associations using the
"place-of-operations" test for the centralized association and the
"nerve-center" test for the diversified association.
In Kelly v. United States Steel Corp.,82 where the court was faced
with a far-flung corporation, neither of the traditional tests was ac-
cepted as determinative of the principal place of business. Instead
the court looked to the location of the "headquarters of day-to-day
corporate activity and management."83 The Kelly test emphasizes
daily operational control, rather than situs of high-level decision-
making8 It might provide a precedent allowing recognition of strong
local labor organizations as citizens of the state of decision-making.
Such union locals, relatively independent from their national organi-
zations, would thus be properly subjected to the risks of local litiga-
tion. The Kelly test would avoid the impossibility of finding a
principal place of operations within the national union, and the un-
reality of characterizing the national headquarters as the nerve center.
Partnerships with local clientele at several branch offices in different
states also might lose their diversity citizenship in a court applying
the Kelly test.
The distinction between the "nerve-center" and "place-of-
operations" tests is blurred by Kelly, however proper that decision is
on its facts. This situation at least suggests that a wholesale transfer
of the body of corporate case law under the 1958 amendment to the
determination of citizenship of unincorporated associations would
spawn divergent results.
80. Supra note 77.
81. Moore & Weekstein, supra note 79, at 1442. The test has been suggested as
peculiarly applicable to corporations engaged in a single operational activity such as
transportation. Id. at 1444; see Herschel v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 347
(S.D.N.Y. 1963).
82. 284 F.2d 850 (3d Cir. 1960).
83. Id. at 854.
84. Moore & Weckstein, supra note 79, at 1444; see United Indus. Corp. v. Gira, 204
F. Supp. 410, 414 (D. Del. 1961) (following the "legal guidelines" of Kelly); Textron
Electronics, Inc. v. Unholtz-Dickie Corp., 193 F. Supp. 456, 459 (D. Conn. 1961)
(unnecessary to distinguish Kelly and "nerve-center" tests on facts of case).
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Further confusion could result from analogies to the decisions
concerning foreign corporations and corporations created by acts of
Congress.85 Foreign corporations, as do unincorporated associations,
have no state of incorporation within the United States. A finding
of state citizenship, then, might be based upon a test relevant to
unincorporated associations, although foreign corporations are prob-
ably not included under the principal place of business provisions
of the 1958 Amendment.86 The question remains unsettled, however,
and decisions finding American citizenship for foreign corporations
in diversity situations would not be unexpected.8 7
Decisions prior to the 1958 amendment dealing with corporations
created by acts of Congress might also be applied to unincorporated
associations. 8 Such corporations were deemed to be citizens only
of the United States, not of particular states, unless their businesses
were "localized" within one state.89 The criteria for determination
of localization have not been thoroughly examined, but "several
factors seem significant. A corporation restricted by its federal charter
to operate in one state only is usually held to be 'localized' in that
state. Federal corporations which are authorized to operate in several
states may also be 'localized' in one state if, in fact, they operate
in that state alone."90 This body of case law might apply to joint
stock companies organized under the laws of one or more states, but
localized in only a single state. Similar citizenship might be found
for "localized" limited partnerships, which qualify for operations in
several states.
Another standard suggested for determination of citizenship is the
"substantial business" test.91 Under this test, small local subdivisions
would have federal diversity if their proportion of activity in the total
enterprise were not "substantial," whereas the large local subsidiary
would be unable to escape the state courts by the fiction of foreign
85. Cf. Moore & Weckstein, supra note 79, at 1435-37.
86. Eisenberg v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., 189 F. Supp. 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
87. A foreign corporation could have citizenship in the state of its principal place of
business in the United States, or alternatively in the state of its worldwide principal
place of business. See Moore & Weckstein, supra note 79, at 1435. The American Law
Institute has suggested dual citizenship of foreign corporations, using the foreign state
of incorporation and the worldwide place of principal business. ALI STUDY, supra note
64, at 57-58.
88. See, e.g., Orange Nat'l Bank v. Traver, 7 Fed. 146, 149 (9th Cir. 1881) (national
bank deemed citizen of state wherein located); Elwert v. Pacific First Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 138 F. Supp. 395, 402 (D. Ore. 1956) (common law rule of localized
federal corporations not abolished). See codification of rule in 28 U.S.C. § 1348 (1964)
("deemed citizens of the States in which they are respectively located").
89. Moore & Weckstein, supra note 79, at 1437 & n.67.
90. Ibid.
91. Id. at 1433; Note, 6 UTAH L. RFrv. 231, 242-43 (1958).
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citizenship. This, along with the Kelly test, seems most appropriate
for the diversity problems of national labor unions. A necessary
corollary of the test is that an unincorporated association could have
more than one place of "substantial business." 2 Yet as the corporate
precedents indicate, a decentralized association could not avoid
federal jurisdiction by a claim that no one of its places of operation
did a substantial part of its business.
93
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION BY THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE
The one concrete legislative proposal to date is that of the American
Law Institute's Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State
and Federal Courts. 4 The Official Draft provides for citizenship of
unincorporated associations in the state of principal place of business."
The Institute justifies its conclusion by noting the effects of the
extended jurisdiction.
One practical effect is not to deprive an out-of-state plaintiff suing such
an association in the state of its principal activity from access to the federal
court because a member of the association is of the same citizenship as the
plaintiff. Also, the association with its principal place of business in another
state suing as a plaintiff will not be barred from a federal forum simply
because one of its members is of the same citizenship as the defendant.9 6
92. See Sperry Prods., Inc. v. Association of Am. R.Rs., 132 F.2d 408, 412 (2d Cir.
1942) (Frank, J., concurring), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 744 (1943). Contra, Kaufman
v. General Ins. Co. of America, 192 F. Supp. 238 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
93. See Egan v. American Airlines, Inc., 324 F.2d 565, 566 (2d Cir. 1963); Inland
Rubber Corp. v. Triple A Tire Serv., Inc., supra note 77, at 492-94.
Two other tests deserve mention. The "gross income" test is a variation on the
substantial business theme, finding citizenship in the state from which an enterprise
derives more than half of its gross income. This test was part of the original proposal
to amend diversity requirements in 1958. Its obvious weakness is the danger of no
citizenship for a diversified corporation. See discussion in Inland Rubber Corp. v.
Triple A Tire Serv., Inc., supra note 77, at 492-93. The other test is the "state-of
impingement" test. It finds citizenship in the state where the bulk of litigation arises,
most customers reside, the greatest gross income is derived, and the organization is
"generally considered to be 'at home.' . . . And this state is more likely to be the
one where the actual physical operations are carried on and directed than the place
where high-level policy decisions are made." Moore & Weckstein, supra note 79, at
1444-45. The test, however, appears unworkable. Its combination of tests to find the
state most impinged would likely result in a cumulation of the problems of each of the
individual tests. See also 72 HAav. L. REv. 391, 394 (1958).
94. ALI SrTuny, supra note 64.
95. Id. at § 1301(b)(2): "(2) A partnership or other unincorporated association
capable of suing or being sued as an entity in the State in which an action is brought
shall be deemed a citizen of the State or foreign state where it has its principal place
of business, whether such action is brought by or against such partnership or other
unincorporated association or by or against any person as an agent or representative
thereof."
96. Id., commentary at 59.
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While the commentary to the Official Draft properly finds "sound
reason" for giving an unincorporated association a citizenship separate
from that of its members,97 its conclusion to use the "principal place
of business" test for diversity purposes is relatively unsupported. No
definition of "principal place of business" is given, so that the ap-
propriateness of the test remains unevaluated. The Institute deter-
mined to leave the "sharpening" of the definition "to the decisional
processes of the courts rather than to attempt further refinement by
statute."98 While the courts may be better equipped to define
"principal place of business," and an ad hoc judicial approach may
be superior to a legislative decree, the propriety of each of the various
interpretations of "principal place of business" to unincorporated
associations should have been established. The "never-center," 99
"place-of-operations," 100 and Kelly'01 tests each have viability in certain
corporate situations, but might be found inapplicable for unin-
corporated associations in similar situations. Consideration should
also have been given to the "localized business,"102 "substantial busi-
ness," 10 3 "gross income,"'04 and "state-of-impingement"f 0 tests.
V. CONCLUSION
Whatever the merits of the broad unsharpened definition of
"principal place of business," the Supreme Court had the opportunity
to adopt it in 1965, and refused to do S0.106 What the Court apparently
desires is a comprehensive definition, with variations particularized
for each type of unincorporated association. Congress, of course,
could pass the burden of definition back to the courts, either by inaction
or passage of a general jurisdictional test; but the plea for legislative
guidance should be heeded. The proper course should include full
analysis of each suggested test for "principal place of business," and a
selection of appropriate standards for each form of unincorporated
association. Specifically, the legislature must not avoid the question
of citizenship for labor unions with local as well as national organiza-
tions, which Mr. Justice Fortas noted as requiring non-judicial reso-
97. ibid.
98. Id., commentary at 57.
99. See text accompanying note 76 supra.
100. See text accompanying note 79 supra.
101. See text accompanying note 82 supra.
102. See text accompanying note 88 supra.
103. See text accompanying note 91 supra.
104. See discussion at note 93 supra.
105. Ibid.
106. United Steelworkers v. R. H. Bouligny, Inc., supra note 59, at 153.
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lution. 10 7 Partnerships, joint stock companies, and other unin-
corporated associations with a profit-making purpose must be related
to their incorporated counterparts, with a similar selection of jurisdic-
tional tests. Perhaps the American Law Institute's suggestion that
"local establishments" for more than two years should disable unin-
corporated associations from initiating litigation in federal courts of
such states'08 is the panacea for federal diversity jurisdiction.'09
What is certain, though, is the need for firm legislative recognition
of unincorporated associations as juridical persons for purposes of
federal diversity jurisdiction, and selection of an unambiguous means
for determining state citizenship of unincorporated associations.
Protecting the Client When His Lawyer Dies
The problems which arise when a practicing attorney suddenly dies
take many shapes. Those which face the law firm are of both an
ethical nature, involving the continuance or disposition of the lawyer's
practice, and a legal nature, concerning the re-organization of the law
firm or the termination of the attorney-client relationship.' The extent
to which a client's interests are affected when his attorney dies de-
pends upon two basic factors: whether he had notice of his lawyer's
death; and whether he had time, after receiving notice, to take the
necessary steps to protect his interests. It is the purpose of this
comment to relate these factors of "notice" and "time to act" to
three situations: (1) where the confusion incident to an attorney's
death causes the statute of limitations to run before a complaint
can be filed for the prospective plaintiff, (2) where the con-
fusion incident to an attorney's death causes the statutory time for
perfecting an appeal to elapse before an appeal can be filed for the
prospective appellant, and (3) where the attorney's death and con-
sequent failure to appear in court causes a defendant to suffer a
default judgment or a plaintiff to suffer a dismissal for failure to
prosecute. The granting of continuances will be discussed in connec-
tion with the latter situation.
107. Id. at 152-53.
108. ALI STUDY, supra note 64, at § 1302(b); see also note 95 supra.
109. See criticism of ALI proposal in Moore & Weckstein, supra note 79, at 1451
("wholesale emasculation" of diversity jurisdiction).
1. See Note, The Death of a Lawyer, 56 CoLum. L. REv. 606 (1956).
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I. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
When an attorney, representing a prospective plaintiff, dies before
he has an opportunity to file a complaint, the confusion incident to
the death may cause enough delay to allow the statute of limitations
to run. Even if the deceased attorney had been a member of a law
firm, it is likely that he had begun preparation of the complaint
without consultation with his colleagues; thus, they would not be
immediately aware of the urgency in commencing judicial proceed-
ings. The professional colleagues of the deceased attorney would
first turn their attention to his pending litigation,2 and it is possible
that the statute of limitations could run before they discovered from
his files that he was preparing a complaint. Where the deceased
attorney had been a single practitioner, the problem is much more
acute. The attorney's files are turned over to his executor; but the
executor is not permitted to reveal their contents, and he may not
give another attorney permission to go through them without the
client's consent.3 If the client is vacationing, or for some other reason
cannot be readily reached, the statute of limitations may run and thus
bar his cause of action.
Those who argue that legislation with respect to the attorney's
death is not needed contend that it is the responsibility of the client,
rather than that of the attorney, to commence proceedings before the
running of the statute of limitations. 4 Furthermore, they suggest that
the attorney's death would rarely result in the running of the statute
unless the client had delayed dangerously long before bringing the
matter to the attorney.5 While it may be true that the client has the
responsibility for initiating judicial proceedings and that he should
not be protected if he delays dangerously long before bringing his
problem to the attorney, it does not seem just to penalize the diligent
as well as the negligent client because of circumstances over which
2. The client has the option to terminate his contract with the firm when the partner
with whom he had consulted dies. Clifton v. Clark, 83 Miss. 446, 36 So. 251 (1903).
But where the client does not exercise this option, it is proper for the professional
colleagues of the deceased attorney to take such steps as are necessary to protect
the immediate interests of his clients. A.m pcAN BAn AssociAioN, OPINIONS OF THE
CommrEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETucs AND GRIEVANCES, No. 266 (1947).
3. ibid.
4. In the event of the death of the person entitled to sue, most states have statutes
which suspend the operation of the statute of limitations, thus giving the prospective
plaintiff's representative added time for filing suit. See, e.g., CAL. CODE CIV. Pnoc. §
353 (six month extension); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-231 (1947) (one year extension);
MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 93-2704 (1947) (one year extension); UTAH CODE ANN. §
78-12-37 (1953) (one year extension). This type of legislation seems equally ap-
plicable to situations in which the prospective client's attorney dies prior to filing of
the suit.
5. See Note, supra note 1, at 610.
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he had no control. The bar which the statute of limitations raises
does not discriminate-its arbitrary time limit allows no distinction
between the diligent and the non-diligent client. Such an inflexible
statute works an injustice where the client was diligent, had no
knowledge of the attorney's death, and relied on the attorney's promise
to "take care of things."6
This injustice could be alleviated by legislation extending the period
of the limitation when the attorney for the prospective plaintiff dies.
The duty of giving notice must necessarily fall on the executor or pro-
fessional colleague of the deceased attorney. Because no complaint has
yet been filed, the court does not know the identity of the prospective
plaintiff. Because no process has been served on the proposed de-
fendant, there is no adverse party yet involved in the case. The
executor or professional colleague should be required to give notice
to the client within a short period, say thirty days, after the attorney's
death. All clients whose addresses are known should be given notice
by registered mail. Public notice should then be given through the
local newspaper, thus affording constructive notice to those clients
whose names are not in the deceased attorney's files or whose ad-
dresses are not known.
Notice alone is not sufficient, however, for it is very possible that it
will come after the statute of limitations has run. Therefore, legisla-
tion is needed to toll the running of the statute upon the death of
the attorney, thus giving the prospective plaintiff more time to act.
The unexpired period of limitation would not begin to run until the
client received notice of the death. However, should that unexpired
period be less than a definite statutory time (e.g., six months), then
the client would be given a similar period (i.e., six months) from the
date of receipt of notice in which to file his complaint, irrespective
of the length of the unexpired limitation period. This would be called
a legislative "extension."
If the executor or professional colleague delays longer than thirty
days in giving notice, the extension should nevertheless begin to run
from the date on which the client receives notice or from the date
of the last required publication-with two exceptions. First, if the
defendant can show that the plaintiff had received informal notice
of his attorney's death prior to receipt of notice from the executor
or professional colleague, the extension should in all fairness begin
to run from that earlier date. Our concern is that the client of the
6. When a party must go out of state in order to find a court which has jurisdiction
over the person he wants to sue, he must hire counsel in this out-of-state jurisdiction,
Usually, he will not think it necessary to do anything further until the attorney notifies
him of the trial date.
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deceased attorney receive notice; and whether he receives this notice
officially or unofficially, his duty to act should begin as soon as he is
put on notice. Second, it should be presumed conclusively in all cases
that the client has received notice within a year from the attorney's
death, and the extension should begin to run no later than that date.
Without such a presumption a client who received no informal notice
could take advantage of the executor's negligence and file suit five or
ten years after the attorney's death-a situation that would work an
injustice on the defendant. The presumption may also be justified on
the theory that a reasonable man would not allow an entire year to
elapse without contacting his attorney.
The length of the extension could range anywhere from thirty days
to a year. In determining the period of the extension, we should not
lose sight of the purpose behind the statute of limitations itself, i.e.,
to avoid unfairness to defendants by requiring actions against them to
be brought before they lose their evidence. At the same time, we
should make the extension long enough so that the deceased attorney's
colleague or executor has a reasonable amount of time to notify the
client (assuming that the client does not learn of his attorney's death
through other channels), long enough so that the client then has a
reasonable amount of time to employ new counsel, and long enough
so that the new attorney has a reasonable amount of time to prepare
the complaint. In most instances, thirty days would be an insufficient
extension; yet an extension of a year might actually encourage delay.
Something between ninety days and six months would appear to be a
reasonable compromise.
The possibility that such a statute would be subject to abuse by
fraud can be easily obviated by placing the burden of proof on the
prospective plaintiff. Unless he is -able to show- by clear and con-
vincing evidence that he did in fact consult the deceased attorney,
he would not be entitled to an extension of the statute of limitations.
In this connection the records and files of the deceased attorney
would be material evidence, but they should not be decisive.
II. PERFE CiNG AN APPEAL
When the death of a party's attorney occurs after the entry of an
adverse judgment but prior to the filing of an appeal, the deadline
for perfecting an appeal may be missed. Where the time for filing an
appeal has been made absolute by statute, the courts are powerless
to grant an extension.7 Many courts have held that perfection of an
7. See, e.g., Miller v. Buyer, 77 Colo. 329, 236 Pac. 990 (1925); Johnson v. Union
Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 193 Minn. 357, 258 N.W. 504 (1935); Higgins v. Educators,
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appeal within the time provided by the statute is "jurisdictional";
therefore, they consider themselves to be without jurisdiction to hear
an appeal taken after the expiration of the statutory period.8 Even
where the statutes are not mandatory, the courts have granted exten-
sions only for reasons such as fraud,9 fault of the appellee, 10 and
negligence or error of the court or clerk." The illness of an attorney
has been held to be an insufficient reason for extending the time for
appeal.'2 Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the district
court can extend the time for appeal for thirty days; but this exten-
sion is permitted only on a showing that, through excusable neglect,
the party failed to learn of the entry of the judgment.13 Only where
a statute specifically allows the courts in their discretion to extend
the time for appeal could a party whose attorney dies hope to
obtain relief.14 There is clearly an urgent need for an express
statutory extension of the time for appeal when the prospective ap-
pellant's attorney dies. At present only one state has such a statute.15
Where the deceased attorney had been a member of a law firm,
there may never be any need to seek an extension of the time for
perfecting an appeal. His professional colleagues would, no doubt,
be fully aware of any cases which he had recently lost; and, if for
no other reason than a desire to uphold the firm's reputation, they
would make diligent and immediate efforts to see that appeals are
filed. On the other hand, where the deceased attorney had been a
single practitioner, there is an obvious need for an extension of the
time for an appeal. As mentioned above in connection with the
running of the statute of limitations, a duty to notify the deceased
attorney's clients of his death should be imposed upon the executor.
A problem arises, however, if the client-because of business trips or
147 Pa. Super. 400, 24 A.2d 19 (1942); Memphis & C.R.R. v. Johnson, 84 Tenn. 387
(1886); see generally 3 WoEaNan, AMmuCAN LAW OF ADmINISTRATION § 546, at
1863 (3d ed. 1923).
8. See, e.g., People v. Lewis, 219 Cal. 410, 27 P.2d 73 (1933); Chapman v.
Boehm, 27 Idaho 150, 147 Pac. 289 (1915); Independent Lubricating Co. v. Good,
135 Neb. 171, 280 N.W. 460 (1938); Sorenson v. Korsgaard, 83 Utah 177, 27 P.2d
439 (1933).
9. U.S. v. Gomez, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 752 (1865).
10. Gordon v. Willits, 263 Mass. 516, 161 N.E. 881 (1928).
11. Block v. H. R. Ameling Prospecting Co., 264 S.W. 32 (Mo. App. 1924);
People's Bank & Trust Co. v. Parks, 191 N.C. 263, 131 S.E. 637 (1926).
12. State v. Louisiana Debenture Co., 52 La. Ann. 597, 27 So. 88 (1899).
13. FED. R. Crv. P. 73(a); see generally W ucrr, FFDmAL CourTs § 104, at 406-09
(1963).
14. See, e.g., MAss. STAT. ANN. ch. 231 § 135 (1956); Boston v. Santosuosso, 302
Mass. 169, 18 N.E.2d 1009 (1939).
15. In New York an aggrieved party may take an appeal within sixty days after
the death of his attorney, without application to the appellate court. N.Y. Cxv. PnAc.
LAw § 5514(b).
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vacations-does not receive the notice until after the time for filing
an appeal has elapsed. Even if he had acquired knowledge of his
attorney's death through other channels, he might not be overly
concerned. He might not know, for example, that there is a time
limit on filing an appeal; or he might be confident that the deceased
attorney had already taken the steps necessary to place his case on
the appellate docket and might be of the opinion that it will take
a year or two before the appellate court will have time to hear it. In
either situation he might feel that he has ample time to engage new
counsel. Without any allowance for extension of the time for appeal
upon the death of an attorney, the party who retains a single prac-
titioner may well lose his chance to obtain appellate review of his
case. Such an inequity between the risk taken by the party who
retains a member of a law firm and the risk taken by the party who
retains a single practitioner should be obviated by legislation.
The extension of the time for appeal could begin at the date
of the attorney's death or at the date on which the client receives
notice. New York allows an appeal within sixty days from the date
of the attorney's death. In the interests of fairness and justice, how-
ever, the extension should be measured from the date on which the
client receives notice-whether it be actual or constructive, official
or unofficial.
As in the statute of limitations situation, the length of the exten-
sion could range anywhere from thirty days to a year. It should be
long enough to allow the client reasonable opportunity to search for
a new attorney and to allow the new attorney to prepare the appeal,
yet it should be short enough that it does not cause undue hard-
ship or inconvenience on the appellee. Allowing an appeal within
sixty days of receipt of notice would appear to be a reasonable
compromise.
III. "NoncE To AppoiNT" STATTES
When the attorney dies after judicial proceedings have been com-
menced but before trial, his client may suffer an adverse judgment
because of the attorney's failure to appear in court on the trial date. If
the client is a plaintiff, he could suffer a dismissal for failure to
prosecute; if he is a defendant, he could suffer a default judgment.
To avoid such an injustice, the client should be given notice of his
attorney's death and should have adequate time, after receiving such
notice, to act to protect his interests. Statutes which allow continu-
ances "as the interests of justice may require"16 are of little comfort
16. See, e.g., MD. R. Pioc. 527; cf. 10 U.S.C. § 840 (1959): "A court-martial may
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to a client who had no notice of his attorney's death and who has
already suffered an adverse judgment. Likewise of little comfort are
statutes allowing a continuance for the illness or absence of an
attorney from providential cause. Those who see an adequate remedy
in such statutes not only assume that the client will learn of his at-
torney's death in time to ask for a continuance, but also assume that
"absence from providential cause" includes an attorney's death.' 7
When such a statute provides that the client swear that he expects
his attorney's services at the next term, it is obvious that the attorney's
death could not be advanced as a ground for continuance.' 8
Adequate protection of the client's interests when his attorney
dies just before trial can be provided only through the enactment of
a "notice to appoint" statute.19 Such a statute would require written
notice to be served on the client to appoint another attorney, or to
appear in person, before the adverse party can take further proceed-
ings against him.20 At first glance it might appear that valuable
court time could be saved if the adverse party is permitted to serve
the notice himself. However, because of the potential for contro-
versy regarding delivery of this type of notice,21 it is doubtful that
court time would really be saved in the long run. Requiring the
adverse party to file the notice with the court would appear to be
the preferable approach. It would then be served on the client of
the deceased attorney by an official of the court.22 If there are
several parties to an action, all represented by the deceased attorney,
each party should receive such a notice.23
In determining the amount of time the client should have before
for reasonable cause, grant a continuance to any party for such time, and as often,
as may appear to be just."
One court has held it an abuse of discretion to deny a continuance for the death
of an attorney even in the absence of a "notice to appoint" statute. Mowat v, Walsh,
254 Mich. 302, 236 N.W. 791 (1931).
17. See Note, supra note 1, at 610 n.24 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 81-1413 (1935).
19. Nine states have enacted such statutes. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 286; IDAino
CODE ANN. § 3-206 (1947); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 § 114-4 (Smith-Hurd 1964);
MnqN. STAT. ANNe. § 481.12 (1958); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 93-2104 (1947);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-14 (1953); N.Y. Civ. PnAC. LAw § 321(c); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-51-36 (1953); WASH. RIEv. CODE ANN. § 2.44.060 (1961).
Two States have court rules to the same effect. MD. R. Pnoc. 126 (1963); MicH.
GEN. CT. R. 909 (1963).
20. These "notice to appoint" statutes apply not only to the situation where an
attorney dies, but also to situations where an attorney becomes physically or mentally
incapacitated or is removed or suspended.
21. If this procedure is used, the adverse party should have the burden of proof.
22. One state directs the adverse party to file a motion alleging the fact of the
attorney's death; thereupon, the court will give notice to the client to employ new
counsel. MD. R. PRoc. 126 (1963).
23. See Hickox v. Weaver, 15 Hun. (N.Y.) 375 (1878).
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further proceedings are had against him, we must weigh the dis-
advantage that a short period of delay would work on the client
against the inconvenience and expense that a long period of delay
would impose on the adverse party.2 A thirty day delay would ap-
pear to be a limitation which would not seriously inconvenience the
adverse party, yet it would give the client sufficient time to engage
new counsel. A thirty day period serves the additional purpose of
insuring that the client will exercise diligence and good faith in his
efforts to secure new counsel.
In the event that the client has no known address within the state,
it would appear proper to serve the notice on the clerk of courts. The
waiting period, however, should be extended to sixty days in this situa-
tion in order to give the client a reasonable time to learn of the death
of his attorney and a reasonable time to search for a new one.25
Rather than limiting the "notice to appoint" procedure to the
situation where the sole attorney for a party dies, it would seem
preferable to permit its use whenever a party's sole or leading counsel
dies. The fact that the deceased attorney had consulted other counsel
should not be grounds for denying a continuance unless this other
counsel was an associate in the case, and thus was acquainted with
most of the deceased attorney's activities therein.2
To provide complete protection to the client whose attorney has
died, a "notice to appoint" statute should provide for the setting
aside of judgments taken in violation of its terms. It is very possible
that the adverse party's attorney would not be aware of his opponent's
death (especially in a large city); thus, he would take further pro-
ceedings without giving the required notice. Unless the court or the
court clerk had become aware of the attorney's death from some other
source, it is likely that the request for a judgment of dismissal or
for a default judgment would be granted. Such a judgment could
24. Michigan and New York allow the client thirty days from the date of notice
before any further proceedings may be had against him; Idaho, Minnesota, New
Mexico, and Washington allow twenty days. The other states do not impose any
particular time limit on the client's efforts to engage new counsel, but it has been
held that notice of further proceedings may be served on the client personally if he
has unduly delayed after receiving notice to appoint a new attorney. Hoffman v.
Rowley, 13 Abb. Pr. (N.Y.) 399 (1862).
25. If the client has no known residence within the state, Minnesota allows the
notice to be served on the clerk of courts. There must then be a thirty day wait
before the adverse party may take further proceedings in the case. MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 481.12 (1958).
26. Two states limit the "notice to appoint" procedure to the situation where the
sole attorney for a party dies. MD. R. P:oc. 126 (1963); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 481.12
(1958). In states where the statute contains no such limitation, the courts have
reached a similar result by denying a continuance where the deceased attorney had
other counsel working with him on the case. See, e.g., Ostro, Inc. v. Boydston Bros.,
323 Ill. App. 137, 54 N.E.2d 742 (1944).
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probably be set aside for "unavoidable casualty," "misfortune," or
"inadvertance"z0 where such a remedy is available. Unfortunately,
not all states provide such a remedy; and, unfortunately, not all courts
accept the theory that they have inherent power to give relief from
judgments taken through inadvertance.P It is therefore apparent
that, if the "notice to appoint" statute is to fully protect the interests
of the client whose attorney has died, it should require the courts to
set aside judgments taken in violation of its terms.
IV. CONCLUSION
As long as the notice procedures are not unduly cumbersome and
as long as the time to act is not extended to unreasonable lengths, the
adverse party will suffer very little harm. The inconvenience with
which he is burdened is indeed slight when compared with the
injustice that would befall the deceased attorney's client without
such legislative protection.
The practice of law is a vocation to which stringent professional
qualifications are attached. The bar examiners and the bar associa-
tions take great care to see that only men of exceptional character
and ability are admitted to the profession. The purpose for such
selectiveness is to assure the public that it will receive the best
possible legal services. In light of this great concern over the for-
mation of the attorney-client relationship, it would seem rather incon-
gruous to neglect to provide for the client's protection when the rela-
tionship is abruptly terminated by the attorney's death. To deny
the client time to employ new counsel to protect his interests is to
tell him to maneuver for himself. Such an attitude, with its conse-
quent hardship and injustice, is anathema to our concept of adver-
sarial law. Legislation requiring the executor or professional colleague
of the deceased attorney to give notice to his clients is needed so that
a client has knowledge of his attorney's death. And legislation tolling
the statute of limitations and extending the time for perfecting an
27. IDAHo CODE ANN. § 5-905 (1947) (mistake, inadvertance, surprise, or excusable
neglect); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-1-1 (55)(c) (1953) (for good cause shown);
N.Y. Civ. PnAc. LAW § 5015(a) (excusable default, fraud, misrepresentation, or other
misconduct of an adverse party); OXLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 1031 (1961) (unavoid-
able casualty or misfortune). Cf. Rogers v. Sheppard, 200 Okla. 203, 192 P.2d 643
(1948) (where illness of defendant's attorney so severe as to prevent his attending to
legal business was shown, "unavoidable casualty or misfortune" was established).
28. The New York Court of Appeals has held that the power of a court to give
relief from judgments taken through "mistake, inadvertance, or excusable neglect"
is unlimited-that it has inherent power to open any judgment, upon the showing
of sufficient reason, in the furtherance of justice. Ladd v. Stevenson, 112 N.Y. 325,
332, 19 N.E. 842, 844 (1889).
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appeal is needed so that the client of the deceased attorney has time
to act to protect his interests. "Notice to appoint" legislation is needed
so that the client will have notice of his attorney's death and will
have time to act before he suffers a default judgment or a dismissal for
failure to prosecute.
